

12-1-2021

## Terror Tactics: Vehicular attacks in Israel

Garrett Smith  
*Mississippi State University*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/honorsthesis>

---

### Recommended Citation

Smith, Garrett, "Terror Tactics: Vehicular attacks in Israel" (2021). *Honors Theses*. 94.  
<https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/honorsthesis/94>

This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research at Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact [scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com](mailto:scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com).

# Terrorism Tactics: Vehicular Attacks in Israel

By  
Garrett Smith

---

Benjamin Tkach  
Assistant Professor  
(Director of Thesis)

---

Brian Shoup  
Political Science Department Head  
(Committee Member)

---

Christopher Snyder  
Honors College Dean  
(Shackouls Honors College Representative)

Terrorism Tactics: Vehicular Attacks in Israel

Garrett Smith

Mississippi State University

Honors Undergraduate Thesis

## **Abstract**

Vehicular ramming attacks are a relatively new phenomenon within transnational terrorism. Their use is concentrated heavily within Israel and the West Bank. Using data from the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database, I conduct an analysis of automobile-based terrorist attacks in Israel and the West Bank. I identify examine the relationship between Israeli counterterrorism policy, specifically the institution of barriers to physical movement, and the adoption of vehicle ramming tactics. These walls and checkpoints inadvertently provoke vehicle ramming attacks, even if effective at reducing firearm and explosive-based attacks. Exploration of existing literature on terrorist tactic selection suggests that vehicular attacks should be more widespread, yet these attacks remain limited outside of the Israel-Palestine conflict. This observation remains consistent with the theory that specific Israeli counterterrorist tactics have generated an increase in vehicular terrorism. Early instances of Palestinian vehicular attacks provide insight into the mechanisms at play in inducing and sustaining this phenomenon. I conclude by considering the implications of these mechanisms and potential policy recommendations for Israel, along with any other democratic states facing these attacks.

## **Introduction**

In July 2016, a single jihadist terrorist killed 84 people and injured 434 by driving a cargo truck into a crowd of pedestrians celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France. The attack drew international attention and was just one in a series of Western European attacks attributed to Islamist terrorists, including those in London, Berlin, and Barcelona. These types of lethal attacks occur across geographic and political entities in Western Europe, North America, the Middle East, and East Asia. Impacts on stock markets (Nasdaq, 2016) and tourists make it clear that the effects of these attacks extend beyond their initial destruction. After the Nice attack, French lawmakers voted to extend a national state of emergency rule by six months (Love and Picy, 2016).

The Global Terrorism Database identifies 131 cases of vehicular terrorism in human history. While a relatively small sample size, the spatial and temporal distribution of these incidents raises numerous questions. From 1968-2013, just 23 such attacks occurred worldwide. In 2014, use of vehicular terrorist tactics skyrocketed, generating 108 attacks from 2014 to 2019. Out of these 108 incidents, 68 occurred in Israel and the West Bank. This thesis examines the reasoning behind the tactic's initial emergence and continued prevalence within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What mechanisms contribute to this tactic's concentration within Israel? What factors contributed to its sudden emergence?

No other democracy has experienced even a fraction of the intensity of vehicular terrorism that Israel does, even though vehicular ramming attacks consistently yield injuries at a minimum, with the potential for real devastation as demonstrated in the cases above. France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have all endured a handful of these kinds of attacks, but none have seen it become commonplace, despite general successes in the few

instances that it has been used. While these Western nations also see significantly fewer overall terror attacks than Israel does, vehicular terrorist incidents are still comparatively less frequent, making up a smaller portion of all terrorist incidents. Why would Palestinian terrorists adopt this tactic with such high frequency while other terrorists around the world simply ignore it?

Terrorists choose their tactics and targets for relatively consistent reasons, including in response to state actions, such as counterterrorism policy. Vehicular terrorism is a particularly unique tactic, adopted commonly by lone wolves. I argue that its concentration in Israel is due to the unique counterterrorism approach adopted by the Israeli state. I argue that additional restrictions in the freedom of movement of Palestinians is a catalyst for vehicular attacks. Additionally, I introduce a likely conditionality to the prevalence of Palestinian vehicular terrorism. Reduced levels of organizational control, or the ability of terrorist leaders to direct their operatives, in the wake of the 2014 Gaza war likely affected the dissemination of vehicular terrorism tactics. Further investigation of specific attacks provides insight into the operationalization of the theory, as well as its implications.

Existing literature on terrorist tactics assesses that external factors such as state actions often affect tactical selection, especially in the absence of constraining factors like limited group capability. Israeli state actions against terrorism have been immensely beneficial in affording Israelis the ability to conduct relatively normal lives despite an ever-present next-door terrorist threat. Yet Israel's unique use of restrictions on physical movement as a counterterrorism strategy likely leads to increased levels of vehicular terrorism, contingent upon varying levels of organizational control among Palestinian terrorists. These dynamics have important implications for both Israeli and international counterterrorist strategies.

## **Terrorist Tactic and Target Selection**

Terrorist groups and opposing states constantly adapt in response to one another. Modern transnational terrorism can be traced back to the 1968 hijacking of an Israel El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv (Hoffman, 2005). The hijacking, perpetrated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, marked a turning point in the perceived legitimacy of civilian targets by terrorist groups. Broader shifts followed close behind, as the tactical and targeting preferences of terrorist groups around the globe adapted in response to government tactics. These target selection preferences shape the very nature of terrorism, and are often dictated by either internal organizational preferences (Bloomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler, 2004) or by external actions by state entities (Enders and Sandler, 2004).

Target hardening makes potential terrorist targets more secure, utilizing measures such as heightened surveillance, reduced public access, or increasing the number of on-site security personnel. The most glaring example of target hardening is the post 9/11 airline industry. Just two months after the attacks, the Transportation Security Administration was created to provide enhanced screening of airline passengers and their luggage. Further security measures, such as full body scanners, were implemented in the United States after a failed 2009 airline attack in which an al-Qaeda operative attempted to detonate an explosive hidden within his underwear (Hastings and Chan, 2013). Target hardening relies on an absence of alternative targets. Otherwise, substitution occurs, and terrorists move on to their next most preferred attack strategies.

As state security forces dedicated more resources to protecting diplomatic and military targets, terrorists turned their attention elsewhere. Since 1999, people have become more targeted than property, and the targeting of private parties by transnational terrorists has become

more prevalent due to consistent target hardening by states (Brandt and Sandler 2010, Sandler and Gaibullov, 2019). Target substitution is just one example of the fluid, evolving dynamic between states and terrorist groups. Terror tactic selection also responds frequently to government counterterrorism. Previous work on the tactics of militant organizations has focused primarily on tactical diversification (Horowitz et al. 2017) and intergroup exchange (Jones, 2019). This body of literature points to state pressure, group competition, and group interconnectivity as factors in the development and deployment of new tactics.

Jackson and Frelinger (2008) analyze the variety of weapons that militant groups select from when carrying out organized violence. They find that some groups emphasize variety while others specialize in highly specific types of attacks. In either case, terrorist organizations often stick to a consistent tactical strategy. Hoffman (2001), argues that terrorists prefer conservative, practiced tactics to maximize success. Jackson and Frelinger identify firearms and explosives as the most common of tactics, due in part to their versatility, as well as their availability. Availability, however, varies widely, and can be affected heavily by state actions. Despite state actions designed to limit the availability of firearms or explosives, motor vehicles remain consistently available in industrialized nations.

These pieces all contend that tactics only change in response to specific circumstances. Horowitz et al. (2017) explore such circumstances, finding that two major factors contribute to the process of tactical diversification: state pressure and intergroup competition. This theory relies heavily on the assumptions of organizational analyses of terrorism, namely that terrorist groups seek survival above all else. Groups that face high levels of state pressure are often forced to diversify their tactical portfolio in order to survive. The same can be said for organizations facing high levels of group competition, as they battle each other for recruits and



media attention, both vital for ensuring the continued existence of the entity. The study finds not only that terrorist groups diversify their tactics in response to these pressures, but also that such diversification works. Groups that diversify are more likely to survive. Jones (2019) notes that diversification of violent tactics among militant groups can also come through an exchange of members. Tactics used by one organization may be adopted by another when an operative switches sides.

### **Vehicular Attacks**

The specific adoption of vehicular attacks has yet to be explained. This section examines the primary actors in vehicular attacks – lone wolf terrorists or group operatives. The widespread access to vehicles and their ease of use suggests that nearly all terrorists possess the capability to utilize this tactic, yet so few do. Factors external to the organization, such as state counterterrorism measures, must be at play in cases where vehicular terrorism emerges.

Vehicle attacks are often carried out by lone wolves (Jenkins and Butterworth, 2018). The Global Terrorism Database assigns responsibility for the vast majority of the attacks in this sample to a broadly defined group of “Palestinian Extremists.” Only a handful of attacks can be attributed to established militant groups like Hamas. Many of the same pressures that affect a group’s tactical selection are equally applicable to lone actors. What factors influence a lone wolf terrorist’s choice of tactic? Individual terrorists still compete with each other for state and media attention, respond to many of the same counterterrorism strategies, and face many of the same choices when it comes to tactics and targets. Target hardening and state pressure influence the target and tactic selection of lone actors just as much as established organizations.

Vehicular attacks are new not only to individual terrorist groups, but also relatively new to terrorism as a whole. Vehicular ramming attacks were incredibly rare until 2014, when they emerged in Israel and Palestine. Despite little worldwide usage in the 40 years prior, it quickly became a common tactic among Palestinian Extremists. Over the next two years, there was an incredible spike in usage. By 2016, the emergent tactic was beginning to see increased usage in Western Europe and North America. This spread, or diffusion, of tactics is not entirely unsimilar to the spread of suicide bombings, as documented by Horowitz (2010). In his investigation, Horowitz heavily considers adoption capacity theory. Adoption capacity theory states that, in order for a new tactic to be adopted, the individual operative must be capable of adoption. Capability is often defined as organizational or financial capacity, and his article focuses on the capability-based constraints that often prevent groups from adopting especially lethal suicide tactics. These constraints are almost non-existent when it comes to terribly simple vehicle tactics, making them openly available to practically any would-be terrorist. Simply put, while many groups seek to diversify in response to pressure or competition, only certain groups do, specifically those possessing the capability to do so. Given that vehicular ramming attacks are incredibly low tech and low cost, nearly all groups and individuals are perfectly capable of executing this type of attack.

The literature clearly establishes that terrorists often base their own tactics and targets on variables that are often outside of their own control. State pressure, group competition, and other factors can change the tactical portfolio of an organization. The concept of tactical diversification does not specifically describe the expansion to vehicle attacks. Other possibilities mentioned by Horowitz et al. (2017) include suicide bombing, improvised explosive devices, aerial hijacking, kidnapping, and the use of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD). The

mechanisms of diversification do not explain the usage of highly specific vehicular ramming tactics. However, if state pressure can produce a diversification of terrorist tactics, is it possible that specific types of state pressure, such as specific counterterrorist policies, can produce specific tactics, such as vehicular ramming attacks? Otherwise, we would expect to see vehicular ramming attacks emerge worldwide, as other groups respond to their own state pressures. Instead, we have seen relatively limited diffusion of vehicular ramming attacks, especially given its incredible simplicity and low adoption capacity threshold. Just like terrorism tactics, strategies geared towards countering transnational terrorism tend to spread quickly amongst states (Neumayer et al., 2014). Yet, vehicular terrorism remains highly concentrated within Israel. What unique aspects of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and specifically Israeli counterterrorism, could potentially be producing higher frequencies of this type of attack? Take a closer look at Israel's complex and extensive counterterrorism strategy.

### **Israeli Counterterrorism**

Israeli counterterrorism is often effective at reducing the lethality of terrorist attacks against civilians. Through a combination and variation of strategies and tactics, Israel has battled persistent terrorism for decades. Given the importance of state actions in dictating the tactical and targeting preferences of terrorist organizations, it is necessary to closely examine Israel's counterterrorism efforts to better understand their struggles with vehicular terrorism.

Israel faces a more severe threat than any other nation across the globe, existing as a state in large part defined by its counterterrorism efforts and strategies. At times these strategies have been successful in limiting political violence (Byman, 2015), and at others they have undermined Israel's international standing (United Nations, 2009). The mixed bag of results is mostly due to

a lack of overall strategy on Israel's part, a likely difficulty in the world of counterterrorism, where responses are dictated not by the respondents, but by the threats they face. Hamas and other groups constantly adapt in order to present a greater threat to their opponent. As these groups evolve, so too must counterterrorism.

Israel's counterterrorism strategy can be divided into two primary policy patterns: offensive and defensive. Offensive strategies rely heavily on intelligence and military operations. Examples include targeted killings of terrorist leaders and essential personnel, as well as blockades and operations to prevent the transfer of weapons to Hamas or other Palestinian groups. Routine practice of these types of operations has allowed Israel to become highly efficient at executing them. They are capable of deploying forces against impending attacks mere minutes after a report is called in (Freilich, 2015). Freilich calls this the "intelligence-operations circle," given the extreme speed with which Israeli forces are able to turn intelligence into action. These capabilities and practices may draw international ire, but research shows they are highly effective at saving Israeli lives. Frisch (2006) finds that Israel's offensive measures during the Second Intifada considerably reduced the ability of Palestinian terrorists to inflict harm. The study argues that targeted killings caused a decrease in the effectiveness of Palestinian suicide attacks. Kaplan et al. (2006) argues that preventative arrests, not targeted killings, reduced the effectiveness of suicide attacks. However, these arrests were a part of the same offensive operations, and therefore we can conclude that offensive measures as a whole reduce suicide terror effectiveness. Frisch goes on to consider the possibility that the construction of the border wall reduced the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks, but ultimately concludes that this defensive strategy was not the sole cause, since attacks outside of the wall (in the West Bank) decreased even more than attacks inside the wall.

In the end, these offensive strategies saved hundreds of lives not only because they made suicide terrorism less effective, but because they pushed would-be suicide terrorists to adopt different tactics, such as Qassam rockets. Rocket attacks skyrocketed by 300 percent from 2003 to 2004, while mortar attacks jumped by 200 percent, all amidst a 40 percent decline in successful suicide attacks. The benefits of pushing terrorists to use another tactic may initially seem unclear, but they reveal themselves in the comparative casualty rates of Qassam rockets. Frisch shows that 610 rocket attacks resulted in only 2 Israeli fatalities, a 0.3% fatality rate. This is a huge success compared to the average of .9 Israeli deaths per attempted Palestinian suicide attack. These statistics serve as evidence in support of offensive counterterrorism strategies. Frisch notes that they may not necessarily reduce Palestinian motivation, as the popularity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad remained relatively stable. However, they do dramatically reduce capability by pushing groups to adopt less effective tactics, saving lives in the process.

Defensive measures are also designed to reduce terrorist capability without necessarily reducing motivation. Israel has engaged in such defensive strategies on an enormous scale. These include target hardening of embassies and institutions, as well as deploying fencing along all their border areas. Naval patrols at sea blockade the Gaza Strip, preventing arms imports to militant groups like Hamas, but also drastically limiting the growth of a Palestinian economy. Roadblocks and checkpoints are also an important impediment to terrorist movement. Finally, and perhaps most significantly is Israel's missile defense systems. In the years since the Second Intifada, Hamas rockets have grown more common, with over 17,000 fired between 2001 and 2013 (Freilich, 2015). Israel responded in kind with its Iron Dome missile defense program, a rocket shield that launches interceptors to destroy incoming Hamas rockets. Its success was best demonstrated in two separate conflicts in 2012 and 2014. During the 2012 conflict, the Iron

Dome intercepted 84% of 1,506 rockets fired by Hamas. The remaining 16% killed only five Israelis and wounded 240 others. During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Hamas fired 4,564 rockets, but the Iron Dome was even more effective this time, and only two civilians were killed. The effect is similar to that of the offensive tactics discussed earlier, reducing capability without reducing motivation. Even as attacks go up, as they did from the 2012 to 2014 operations, fatalities go down. The marginal effect of each terrorist rocket is dramatically reduced. These defensive measures are immensely effective, but come at a high cost, as Israel outspends Hamas by tens of thousands of dollars each time it shoots down a rocket. Still, the ability of Israel's citizenry to lead seemingly normal lives amidst these frequent rocket attacks is in large part due to the successes of the Iron Dome.

Another key staple of Israeli counterterrorism is physical barriers. From its national border wall to its numerous scattered checkpoints, Israel is able to exhibit significant control over the movement of Palestinians both inside and outside its borders. Rijke (2020) notes that checkpoints also operate as a surveillance mechanism. With 98 checkpoints in the West Bank, Israel is able to better track Palestinian movement, allowing for quick intelligence to operations responses in the event of terrorist attacks or threats. Another significant barrier to the movement of Palestinians is the spread of Israeli settlements, which divide traditionally Palestinian territory. Not only are these settlements widely condemned on the international stage, they further restrict the movement of Palestinians because they are often closed to entry for Palestinians, forcing them to find other, less efficient ways to reach their destinations.

The indiscriminate nature of physical barriers separates it from other tactics. Unlike Iron Dome interceptor missiles that only launch in response to incoming Hamas rockets or offensive operations that only target terrorists, checkpoints are a highly indiscriminate tactic, affecting

large swathes of the Palestinian population. As a result, they can become a point of contention or grievance for the non-radicalized populace. This can be a dangerous decision for Israel, as Palestinian groups like Hamas design propaganda that highlights these grievances, looking for more radicals to join their cause. Ultimately, the restriction of physical movement through walls and checkpoints is a strategy designed with the same intended result as the rest of Israel's counterterrorism portfolio. The nation constantly seeks to reduce terrorist capability without addressing motivation.

Israel's indiscriminate counterterrorism policies have been particularly harmful to their reputation. Tactics such as checkpoints and blockades affect the whole of the Palestinian population, not just militants. Additionally, civilian casualties during open conflict, such as Operation Protective Edge, have raised serious concerns about Israel's counterterrorism operations. The United Nations Human Rights Council identified nearly 1500 Palestinian civilian casualties during the three-month long conflict. Other human rights watch groups have carefully tracked civilian casualties throughout numerous smaller operations carried out by Israeli forces, including the aforementioned targeted killings.

The common theme of Israel's defense is its ability to evolve along with the threats it faces. While it has made little progress to "end" the terrorist threat it faces, it has achieved remarkable feats in reducing terrorist violence, all the while maintaining a stable and flourishing society. Targeted killings, physical barriers, and missile defense systems have dramatically reduced the ability of Hamas and other Palestinian groups to interrupt Israeli daily life. While the threat still exists, and the motivation has apparently not waned, Israel's responses have indubitably saved thousands of lives throughout the conflict.

## **The Relationship between Counterterrorism and Vehicular Tactics**

Israel's counterterrorism policies drive terrorist attacks. Specific state actions elicit specific militant responses. The concentration of vehicular terrorism within Israel suggests something specific or unique about their own policies. There are certainly other examples of unique policy in the above analysis, but it seems hardly likely that the Iron Dome could specifically contribute to the usage of vehicle ramming attacks, other than by potentially making them comparatively more effective than rocket attacks. This argument seems especially moot when considering the so-far consistent usage of rocket attacks. Instead, I argue that Israel's most indiscriminate counterterrorism policy, their constant obstruction of physical movement, is an important contributor to the expansion of Palestinian ramming attacks.

Israeli policy explains the concentration of attacks when comparing amongst democracies. Vehicle attacks in other democratic states are limited compared to Israel, despite shared regime characteristics connected to terrorism more broadly (Chenwoeth, 2013; Li, 2005; Enders and Sandler, 2006). The low adoption capacity threshold makes the tactic viable for individuals and organizations the world over. Yet, over 60% of the world's vehicular ramming attacks have taken place in Israel. This suggests that a very specific type of interaction is occurring within this conflict, rather than the general state pressures that might lead to a general diversification of tactics.

### **Limiting Mobility**

The restriction of physical movement is Israel's most unique counterterrorism strategy when compared to other democracies. Checkpoints and walls are an integral part of daily life in Israel and Palestine. Even if effective at preventing firearm or explosive-based attacks, they



represent a significant point of contention for the Palestinian population. Rijke (2020) argues that these checkpoints simultaneously serve as a mechanism for ensuring the quick and efficient movement of Israeli citizens, while also drastically hindering the movement of Palestinians. The restriction of physical movement not only represents one of the many grievances that the Palestinian population has with Israel, but also a specific point of frustration that could potentially boil over into violence. In many cases, the grievance becomes the target, as vehicular ramming attacks are disproportionately targeted at Israeli Defense Force checkpoints, and many of the victims have been IDF soldiers. At least 12 attacks targeting checkpoints have been identified in this sample, and many more have targeted the IDF forces that frequently staff them. The third aspect of the attack, the tactic or weapon, is also inherently tied into the theme of movement, as vehicles represent mobility. The interconnection of the initial grievance, tactic, and target is an interesting insight into the political nature of terrorism.

Indiscriminate restrictions in movement are invasive and pervasive in the sense that their effects often permeate deep within Palestinian society. Palestinians with Israeli worker permits wait in line for hours on a daily basis to enter a territory that is normally closed to them. At the same time, deeper within the West Bank, Israeli settlements are built in a way that cuts off Palestinian communities from each other. These settlements are generally protected against Palestinians, meaning travelers must go around. With such a consistent impact on Palestinian livelihoods, it seems possible that this intentional hindrance might cause instantaneous radicalization as aggression boils over into violence against an upcoming checkpoint or other obstruction. While this may be the case in some instances, a criminological paper by Hasisi et al. (2019) disputes this theory. The authors review existing research on the spatial realities of crime, comparing it with the recent rise in vehicular terrorism in Israel and the West Bank.

Criminological research indicates that crime is most often committed on the edge of the perpetrator's "activity space," or the totality of the space in which they routinely find themselves, including school, work, grocery stores, and any other frequently visited location. Hasisi et al. (2019) conduct a geographic analysis of Palestinian vehicular terrorism, revealing a concentration of terrorist attacks in just a few locations in Jerusalem and the West Bank, typically on the edges between predominately Arab and predominately Jewish neighborhoods. These results fall right in line with work by Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) suggesting that crime will occur in the overlap between a motivated offender and a suitable target's activity spaces. Further analysis demonstrates that attackers drove an average of 13.5 kilometers in order to carry out these particular attacks, suggesting an active pursuit of an attack rather than spur of the moment aggression. Whether individual actors or group operatives, at least some level of forethought and planning is present, and overarching motives and grievances are still shared.

### **Blame Attribution**

After a vehicular attack killed four Israeli soldiers in Jerusalem on January 8<sup>th</sup>, 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attributed these types of attacks to impulse actors. "I think the most important thing we need to understand is that we are under a new kind of attack. An attack by a lone assailant who is inspired, and on the spur of the moment decides to act, in this case, a ramming attack." The attack fell well after Israel's peak in vehicular attacks in 2015, but came just after a string of high profile attacks in Western Europe in 2016. Netanyahu went further in assigning blame to the Islamic State, who had carried out recent attacks in Berlin and Nice, as well as releasing a "how to" to guide on how to conduct vehicular attacks as a part of an ISIS magazine on November 11<sup>th</sup>, 2016. While significant, it is important to consider that ISIS

has an international audience, and countless potential terrorists around the world received this guidance, yet the spread of vehicular terrorism remains limited. Even if the perpetrator in this case, Fadi al-Qunbar, had been tactically influenced by ISIS, his grievances were likely more local. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz addressed this in a January 9<sup>th</sup> article entitled “ISIS Theory Suits Netanyahu Well, but Jerusalem Is Not Berlin.” The author, Nir Hasson, argues that Israeli policy is inherently different than other nations dealing with ISIS terrorism, best exemplified in this line from the article. “In Nice a prime minister doesn’t announce the closure of a neighborhood that’s home to tens of thousands of people just because one of them was a terrorist.” Themes of limited mobility and indiscriminate policy prevail.

### **Organizational Control**

There is, however, potentially a conditionality on the impact of these policies. The theory is simple enough, that Israel’s uniquely indiscriminate counterterrorism policies result in a unique struggle with vehicular ramming attacks. However, this does not acknowledge the reality that many of these policies predate the rapid rise in these kinds of attacks experienced by Israel in 2014. What precipitants could have produced this spike? This remains less clear, although organizational theories of terrorism may provide some insight.

Organizational control is an incredibly important aspect of militant violence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, terrorist leaders often had a lower appetite for violence than their operatives, as shown by Abrahms and Potter (2015). The authors find that a lack of leadership within militant organizations, often caused by leadership decapitation, results in a lower level of discrimination in attacks. States pursue policies of leadership decapitation by targeting terrorist leadership in hopes of degrading organizational capability. When leadership structure is

degraded, organizational control is decreased, and higher frequency of attacks is expected. This might apply not only to terrorist operatives but also to at large civilians. As terrorist groups lose control and capacity, they lose their ability as a representative of the aggrieved population, potentially propagating lone wolf terrorism. Coggins (2015) specifically finds that failing political representation can result in terrorism.

GTD data confirms that Israel has been experiencing statistically what might be considered a “Third Intifada.” The first two Intifadas represent some of the most contentious times in modern Israeli-Palestinian relations, characterized by daily protests and frequent suicide bombings. These multi-year uprisings brought significant increases in Palestinian terror against Israel. These levels of terrorism have not been seen since 2003, at least not until the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War, also known as Operation Protective Edge. During this conflict, Israel launched large scale operations targeted at Hamas personnel and infrastructure in Gaza. The incursion quickly escalated, and Hamas renewed a campaign of rocket strikes against Israel. The IDF responded with air strikes and a full-scale ground invasion, successfully destroying dozens of tunnels utilized by Hamas, and eliminating several high profile Hamas commanders. At the conflict’s conclusion seven weeks later, Israel had severely degraded Hamas’s infrastructure, including through leadership decapitation, as in the case of an airstrike that killed three of their top commanders on August 21, 2014 (Booth, 2014). The Jerusalem Post (2014) reported that “nearly all” of Hamas’s West Bank leadership was arrested during Operation Protective Edge.

Shapiro (2015) explores the effect of these periods of violence on organizational control and terrorism, through the lens of the security-control tradeoff. Essentially, terrorist leaders must routinely sacrifice either security or control for the other as a part of their clandestine operations. Constant communication and oversight are required to ensure that their highest preferred tactics

are used and targets are hit, realities that are just not possible when being pursued or hunted by the state. As a result, leaders must occasionally sacrifice control in order to remain secure. State pressure most directly affects organizational control, shifting the range of the tradeoff. Shapiro finds that Hamas operatives carry out more attacks during the Intifadas, as increased state pressure decreases organizational control. In between Intifadas, as control is retained, attacks are reduced. This potentially explains the overall increase in terrorism that Israel experienced in 2014, as Palestinian groups and individuals responded to decreased organizational control and political representation in the wake of the 2014 Gaza War. These dynamics are important for understanding unaffiliated and unsanctioned attacks. Such attacks inherently rely on less organizational capability, therefore likelier to utilize tactics with a low adoption threshold, such as vehicular tactics. The interaction between this loss of control and Israel's indiscriminate counterterrorism policy likely produced the 2014 spike in vehicular terror.

### **Hamas Attack**

The specific incident that arguably sparked the rapid spike in Palestinian conducted vehicle ramming terrorist attacks was actually an accident. On October 19, 2014, a Jewish settler struck two five-year-old Palestinian girls with his vehicle. Fearing for his life, he fled the scene, and drove to a nearby Jewish settlement before stopping and turning himself in. One of the girls was pronounced dead hours later. Local Palestinians alleged the incident was intentional, the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations, Riyad Mansour, wrote a letter to the UN security council requesting that Israel reign in terrorist settlers. While Israeli authorities ruled the death an accident, Hamas saw it as justification for its ensuing attacks.

Just one week later, a 21-year-old Palestinian man by the name of Abd el-Rahman Shaloudi veered his father's car off the road in East Jerusalem, accelerating down a pathway full of pedestrians as they exited a light-rail. The train station attack resulted in two deaths: a three month-old Israeli-American citizen and a 22 year old Ecuadorian woman. Seven others, including the infant girl's parents, were injured in the attack. Shaloudi was shot and killed by the Shin Bet as he attempted to flee the scene. Later that night, Palestinian protestors violently clashed with police in Shaloudi's home neighborhood of Silwan, a suburb of Jerusalem and the site of growing tensions as a result of increased Jewish settlement (Lewis, 2014).

Shaloudi's violent actions were not without precedent. Despite his young age, he had served two prior prison sentences for terrorist activity, pleading guilty to attempted arson and aggravated assault. Shaloudi was also an open supporter of Hamas, posting public praise for the group on his Facebook page. The most striking connection between the attacker and the Palestinian terrorist group is Shaloudi's uncle, Muhi a-Din Sharif, a former Hamas commander and the group's chief bomb-maker until his death in 1998. Hamas did not claim responsibility for the attack, but Israeli officials deemed them responsible after considering the above connections and a statement from Hamas praising the attack and calling it a "natural response" to the hit-and-run incident in the West Bank. Shaloudi's family also claimed the incident was purely accidental, but his connections with Hamas cast serious doubt on the claim, as does the sheer improbability of accidentally speeding down a populated railway platform, leading Israeli officials to dismiss the notion.

The attack was the first in a trend. Five more vehicle ramming attacks were attributed to Hamas by Israeli officials over the next 18 months. Dozens more were carried out by other Palestinian extremists over the same time period. While Israeli Defense Force checkpoints were

disproportionately targeted in this type of attack, train stations and other public transportation locations, such as bus stops, were also frequently targeted. The trend was amplified by media distributed online, primarily cartoons depicting automobiles as viable weapons of terror. While they varied greatly both in style and in point of origin, many could be found on message boards and Facebook pages that consistently posted material sympathetic to Hamas and other Palestinian groups, and all encouraged Palestinian citizens to use their vehicles to run over Israelis. One cartoon specifically targets women and children. Additionally, two Palestinians produced a music video, distributed through YouTube, that called for the “running over” of Israeli soldiers and citizens. These pieces all appeared in late 2014, before 36 vehicular attacks took place in 2015, the highest number on record. The distribution of these kinds of media, and its seemingly substantial subsequent effect, raises questions about how terrorist organizations communicate.

The trend in vehicular attacks may represent a modernization of organizational control. Consider the current power distribution within Palestine. Hamas has a significantly weaker presence in the West Bank, which is predominately controlled by the Palestinian Authority. The vast majority of vehicular ramming attacks in our sample occurred here, often in Jerusalem or adjacent suburbs. While Hamas might openly call for attacks in East Jerusalem, physical barriers and Israeli counterterrorism often prohibit them from carrying out said attacks themselves. As a result, weaker mechanisms of organization control are used, and media distribution to the masses could be the end result. Hamas, weakened in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War, is unable to establish the necessary organizational structure to carry out complex attacks in the West Bank. Instead, they rely on new methods of communication to distribute propaganda across the way, hoping the song “Run Over, Run Over” falls on sympathetic ears, and can translate into

consistent violence against Israel on their behalf. Such methods were unavailable to organizations operating during the timeframe of Shapiro's research on the terrorist's dilemma, as most of his samples end prior to 2010. Still, the same framework of the security-control and security-efficiency tradeoffs may apply. Rather than establishing direct ties and direct lines of communication with operatives in the West Bank, Hamas chooses low risk instructional methods, maintaining most of its security while still communicating a viable attack strategy. Vehicular-ramming attacks are the ideal tactic to delegate to masses, as their low cost and low complexity makes them feasible for untrained would-be operatives. Access to a vehicle is the only necessity to reach the adoption capacity threshold, and even Palestinians who do not own vehicles can likely acquire one from a friend or family member, as was the case with Shaloudi.

In the end, the October 26th attack was not motivated by these cartoons, released after the incident. Whether it was in response to a hit and run by Jewish settlers or growing unrest in East Jerusalem is unknown. However, the aftermath of the attack involved more than the standard pointing of fingers and quickly evolved into the widespread distribution of violence endorsing media across Palestine. This method allows terrorists to efficiently communicate a call for undertaking an incredibly simplistic terrorist attack while making a comparatively small sacrifice to their own security. It was effective, too, resulting in dozens of Palestinian vehicular ramming attacks over the next 18 months. This is the evolving, modern dynamic of Shapiro's security-control model. While tradeoffs are still made and groups still select their preferred levels of security and preferred levels of control or efficiency, advancements in technology, and specifically the development of social media, broaden the range that groups select from. Presented with more options, groups now have effective methods of communicating attack



strategies while sacrificing very little security. The increased range that new technology affords to security tradeoffs is worth exploring in the future.

## **Implications**

The interplay between Israel's restriction of physical movement and vehicular terrorist incidents has significant implications for international human rights, the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israeli counterterrorism, and broader counterterrorism efforts worldwide. By understanding this relationship, states can be more effective at both preventing terrorism and protecting human rights. Are there measures that states, and particularly Israel, can adopt to prevent vehicular ramming attacks, and limit the damage when these attacks do happen?

Efforts by Israel to limit the mobility and restrict the movement of Palestinians have drawn international condemnation, and caused international organizations to take a closer look at these invasive policies. While official data on checkpoints from the Israeli state remains unavailable, some information can be found from Israeli human rights organization B'tselem, Al Jazeera, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs. While there is some statistical variance among these agencies, the United Nations OCHA office identifies 700 Israeli implemented road obstacles in the West Bank. Fully or partially staffed checkpoints make up a large chunk of this list, but these databases also include frequently closed road gates or earth mounds used to limit movement. Rijke (2020) studies a few specific Israeli checkpoints, chronicling the experiences of Palestinians moving through them. She argues these spatial-political technologies are designed to effectively segregate the two populations, not only controlling Palestinian movement but also exerting psychological control, as seen in one of her anonymous interviews.

“Often the soldiers know me, they see me pass through the checkpoint every day. But they still want to stop me. It’s a matter of psychology. They want to give you the feeling that everybody can expect to be stopped, they don’t want you to feel free.”

This is an excellent example of just how indiscriminate these spatial policies are. In this case, the interviewee is known by the soldiers, having traveled through the same checkpoint multiple times, and known to have the proper permit to do so, but is still stopped.

American aviation security is tangential to Israeli checkpoints. Just as most military checkpoints were created following Second Intifada, the Transportation Security Administration was created in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Slow lines, identification checks, and full body scanners are invasive and inconvenient compared to prior security checks. Yet, most if not all have accepted these practices as practical solutions to the risks of airline bombings and hijackings, representing a significant sacrifice in freedom and privacy in order to obtain enhanced levels of security. There are, however, several crucial differences between these cases. First, even the most frequent of flyers do not go through airport security as much as the thousands of Palestinians working in Israel.

Second, these target hardening techniques differ in who they are targeted against. Aviation security screens airline passengers as a means of protecting primarily that same group of passengers, whereas Israeli security forces screen Palestinians as a means of protecting primarily Israelis. This philosophical difference is emblematic of many of the issues and tensions at play within the Israel-Palestine conflict. Third, the United States and other nations institute programs such as the TSA pre-check, designed for frequent low risk travelers to move through airports at a quicker pace.

The realization that these policies may drive vehicular terrorism should inspire serious consideration of their effectiveness. Are these checkpoints actually effective at reducing the highly lethal car bombings and suicide attacks that plagued Israel during the Second Intifada, or are they just perceived to be? Israel must seriously consider the costs of increased vehicle attacks against the benefits of these restrictions on Palestinian movement. Counterterrorism tactics are frequently feared to be causing transference, or shifting rather than removing the problem (Arce and Sandler, 2005). Is Israel trading suicide terrorism for vehicular terrorism? This trade might be accepted by policymakers, given the comparable effectiveness between the two tactics. Reducing capability remains an ineffective way to end terrorism, but it still saves lives.

The world can learn lessons from these tactics. Other democracies have experienced a mere fraction of the vehicular terrorism that Israel has, primarily because none of them institute similarly invasive policies on limited movement. France dealt with the deadliest recorded incident of vehicular terrorism, but has only experienced a handful of attacks overall. France's approach to ethnic integration is also viewed as contentious within other sectors of the Western world, such as their policies banning Muslim headscarves in schools (New York Times Editorial Board, 2020). Despite any perception that these policies may have induced radicalization among French Muslims and motivated some rise in terrorism within France, the data does not support the notion that vehicular terrorism might be caused by these rules. Instead, indiscriminately restricting the movement of whole populations is likely to result in increased levels of vehicular terrorism. States should avoid this when possible. Even when facing campaigns of suicide bombings, as Israel did during the Second Intifada, or other forms of terrorism, states should pursue minimally invasive policies through the full utilization of available technology. As

technology improves, imagine the improved speed with which people or even vehicles could move through scanners designed to detect explosive material. While still protective, these policies would cause minimal limitations in movement and thus theoretically not inspire vehicular terror tactics.

Broader implications can be drawn from the levels of organizational control exhibited by cases of vehicular terrorism. As transnational threats like ISIS emerge, new technology allows an easier conveyance of tactical knowledge and may speed up tactical diffusion. Cartoons, YouTube videos, and newsletters can quite simply spread information on terrorist operations. Vehicular terrorism seems a likely tactic for such diffusion, given the low adoption threshold. While this might not lead towards consistent campaigns of vehicular terrorism in the West, advancing technology shifts the security-control tradeoff, allowing groups and leaders to convey tactics to operatives or unassociated individuals with relative ease and limited security sacrifice. Western democracies are already becoming more aware of the threat of homegrown actors influenced by transnational terrorists, but they need to be equally aware that those individuals need not purchase firearms or explosive vehicles in order to pose a potential threat. Instead, they merely need access to a motor vehicle.

In the meantime, as states do face vehicular terror on varying levels, target hardening is an effective and feasible option. Already implemented in many places, bollards and railing are relatively inexpensive options to literally stop vehicular terrorists in their tracks. These tactics can be used selectively too, protecting at risk locations like outdoor events with nearby road access. These counterterrorist tactics apply across the board, as Israel can use them to protect their most at risk targets, such as checkpoints and public transportation platforms, while Western nations may apply them on a more case by case basis, protecting crowds at concerts, markets, or

public celebrations. ISIS itself called for vehicular attacks targeting “large outdoor festivals, conventions, parades, and celebrations.” There is significant overlap between target preferences of vehicular terrorists and other tactical specialists, with the primary difference being that indoor locations remain inaccessible to this type of attack. As a result, special attention must be given to crowded outdoor events as well as traveling crowds, moving via sidewalk to and from concerts or sports venues. Still, this analysis of vehicular terrorism concludes that these attacks are most likely to emerge from environments in which physical movement is restricted by the state.

## **Conclusion**

Israel is the only nation in the world experiencing substantial levels of vehicular terrorism. These attacks are heavily concentrated in Israel, and are used sparingly throughout the globe, despite their effectiveness and simplicity. Why do transnational terrorists use this tactic so infrequently, save for Palestinian terrorists? Perhaps the simplest of attack strategies, nearly all motivated groups and individuals are able to overcome the adoption capacity theory out vehicular terrorism. Aside from Israel, almost none do. As a result, we must turn to other theories to understand Israel’s experiences with vehicular terrorism.

As a nation, Israel is effective at countering and limiting Palestinian terrorism through a variety of offensive and defensive measures that they have improved upon over decades of conflict. These countermeasures, while often successful, have resulted in continuous adaptations by terrorists, in addition to generating new grievances against the Israeli state. Checkpoints, walls, and other physical barriers limiting Palestinian movement and freedom represent an incredible inconvenience and a severe human rights violation. As repeated interactions occur,

these checkpoints become a legitimate grievance for the Palestinian population, prompting terrorist attacks, including those specifically targeted at the grievances themselves. In an environment where physical movement is constantly constrained, vehicular attacks emerge. Amplified by social media and militant group messaging, this tactic took hold in Israel, and has even begun a slow but steady diffusion through Western Europe and North America. Still, its high concentration within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggests something unique about the context that causes them.

Further research on these topics might focus on a district-level analysis of Palestinian vehicular terrorism. Are attacks more common in areas with higher concentrations of physical barriers? This closer look would allow for a deeper understanding of the connection between the two variables, and prompt review of the costs of physically restrictive policy. In the meantime, democratic states, including Israel, should be wary of indiscriminately restricting the freedom of movement for citizens, so as to avoid the creation of additional grievances. Is Israeli counterterrorism simply engaging in transference, and trading in firearm or explosive attacks for vehicular terrorism? If so, does their comparable lethality make this transference a worthwhile endeavor? These are important policy questions, and further research is needed to best answer them.

## References

- “European Equity Benchmarks Close Mixed, Travel Stocks Hit by Terror Attack in France; Inflation Edges Up.” *Nasdaq*, 15 July 2016, <https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/european-equity-benchmarks-close-mixed-travel-stocks-hit-terror-attack-france-inflation>.
- Abrahms, Max, and Philip B.K. Potter. “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics.” *International Organization*, vol. 69, no. 2, 2015, pp. 311–342., <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000411>.
- Arce, Daniel G., and Todd Sandler. “Counterterrorism.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2005, pp. 183–200., <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272863>.
- Blomberg, S. Brock, et al. “Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations.” *Public Choice*, vol. 149, no. 3-4, 2011, pp. 441–463., <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9837-4>.
- Board, The Editorial. “Responding to Terrorism in France.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 5 Dec. 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/opinion/macron-terrorism-france.html>.
- Booth, William, and Ruth Eglash. “Israeli Airstrikes Kill 3 Top Hamas Commanders in Gaza Strip.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 21 Aug. 2014, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/israeli-airstrikes-kill-3-top-hamas-commanders-in-gaza-strip/2014/08/21/627e90b8-2930-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israeli-airstrikes-kill-3-top-hamas-commanders-in-gaza-strip/2014/08/21/627e90b8-2930-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html).
- Brandt, Patrick T., and Todd Sandler. “What Do Transnational Terrorists Target? Has It Changed? Are We Safer?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 54, no. 2, 2010, pp. 214–236., <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709355437>.
- Brantingham, Patricia, and Paul Brantingham. “Criminality of Place.” *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1995, pp. 5–26., <https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02242925>.
- Byman, Daniel. *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism*. Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Chenwoeth, Erica. “Terrorism and Democracy.” *Annual Review of Political Science*, May 2013.
- Coggins, Bridget L. “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? an Empirical Analysis (1999–2008).” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 59, no. 3, 2014, pp. 455–483., <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515403>.

- ENDERS, WALTER, and TODD SANDLER. “Distribution of Transnational Terrorism among Countries by Income Class and Geography after 9/11.” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 2, 2006, pp. 367–393., <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00406.x>.
- Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. “What Do We Know about the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?” *Cass Series on Political Violence*, 2004, pp. 119–137., <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203500972.ch7>.
- Freilich, Charles David. “Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 29, no. 2, 2015, pp. 359–376., <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1044602>.
- Frisch, Hillel. “Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 29, no. 5, 2006, pp. 843–869., <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600901026>.
- Gaibulloev, Khusray, and Todd Sandler. “What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11.” *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 57, no. 2, 2019, pp. 275–328., <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181444>.
- Hasisi, Badi, et al. “Concentrated and Close to Home: The Spatial Clustering and Distance Decay of Lone Terrorist Vehicular Attacks.” *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2019, pp. 607–645., <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-019-09414-z>.
- Hastings, Justin V., and Ryan J. Chan. “Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling: The Case of Aviation Security.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 25, no. 5, 2013, pp. 777–797., <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.699906>.
- Hoffman, Bruce. “Change and Continuity in Terrorism.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 24, no. 5, 2001, pp. 417–428., <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761001750434268>.
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Horowitz, Michael C. “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism.” *International Organization*, vol. 64, no. 1, 2010, pp. 33–64., <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990233>.
- Horowitz, Michael C., et al. “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence.” *International Organization*, vol. 72, no. 1, 2017, pp. 139–171., <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818317000467>.
- Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict*, United Nations, 2009.



- Jackson, Brian A., and David R. Frelinger. "Rifling through the Terrorists' Arsenal: Exploring Groups' Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 31, no. 7, 2008, pp. 583–604., <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802159989>.
- Jenkins, Brian, and Bruce Butterworth. "'Smashing Into Crowds' -- An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming Attacks." Nov. 2019.
- Jones, Nathan P. "Bacterial Conjugation as a Framework for the Homogenization of Tactics in Mexican Organized Crime." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 44, no. 10, 2019, pp. 855–884., <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1586356>.
- Kaplan, Edward H., et al. "Tactical Prevention of Suicide Bombings in Israel." *Interfaces*, vol. 36, no. 6, 2006, pp. 553–561., <https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.1060.0242>.
- Lewis, Ori. "Palestinian Driver Rams Jerusalem Station Killing Baby." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 22 Oct. 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-violence-jerusalem/palestinian-driver-rams-jerusalem-station-killing-baby-idUSKCN0IB2C320141022>.
- Li, Quan. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2005, pp. 278–297., <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272830>.
- Love, Brian, and Emile Picy. "French Lawmakers Extend State of Emergency after Nice Attack." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 20 July 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-nice/french-lawmakers-extend-state-of-emergency-after-nice-attack-idUSKCN10009V>.
- Neumayer, Eric, et al. "The 'Peer-Effect' in Counterterrorist Policies." *International Organization*, vol. 68, no. 1, 2014, pp. 211–234., <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818313000362>.
- Rijke, Alexandra. "Checkpoint Knowledge: Navigating the Tunnels and Al Walaja Checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Geopolitics*, vol. 26, no. 5, 2020, pp. 1586–1607., <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1737020>.
- Shapiro, Jacob N. *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton University Press, 2015.
- "Watch: West Bank Hamas Leadership in Israeli Custody." *The Jerusalem Post* | *JPost.com*, <https://www.jpost.com/Pillar-of-Defense/Entire-Hamas-leadership-in-West-Bank-in-Israeli-custody-some-may-be-deported-359462>.