Degree
Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA); Bachelor of Accountancy
Major(s)
Finance; Accounting
Document Type
Immediate Open Access
Abstract
In the absence of agency issues, CEOs will act in the best interest of shareholders by maximizing firm value. Existing literature documents the individual agency of the CEO and how firms incentivize CEO behavior to align with shareholder interests. To study groups with varying initial incentives, I divide CEOs into internal and external origin to determine differences in compensation. This study then utilizes regressions to study the differences between candidate origin and corresponding incentive structure. I hypothesize that CEO profile influences compensation design to address candidate skills and agency costs, impacting firm value and market perception of CEO future value. To test this, I develop further event study regressions of stock price returns around announcement of CEO incentive plans to develop insight into how the stock market interprets CEO incentive structures.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.54718/EHMV6569
Date Defended
4-23-2025
Thesis Director
Brandon Cline
Second Committee Member
Brian Blank
Third Committee Member
Christopher Snyder
Recommended Citation
Whitehead, Joshua C., "Measuring Market Sentiment Towards CEO Incentives" (2025). Honors Theses. 181.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/honorstheses/181
