Title

Strategy, Implementation, and State-Building Why Governance Failed after the Post-2011 Drawdown of US Forces From Iraq?

Advisor

Shoup, Brian D.

Committee Member

Tkach, Benjamin

Committee Member

Banerjee, Vasabjit

Date of Degree

1-1-2019

Original embargo terms

Visible to MSU only for 1 Year

Document Type

Graduate Thesis - Open Access

Degree Name

Master of Arts

College

College of Arts and Sciences

Department

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Abstract

In this thesis I argue that US Military and Civilian leadership in Iraq, while both well-trained and well-intentioned, implemented a failed strategy that sought to fill institutional gaps within various national and sub-national governmental entities. This strategy provided short-term gains by increasing the capacity and capability of Iraq’s government to deliver public goods and services to its citizens thereby improving government legitimacy. Yet, in the long-term, a largely decentralized approach to development, a maladaptive transition plan, and an illusory estimate of the capacity of the security apparatus within Iraq proved detrimental to the broader US strategic objectives and state-building efforts in Iraq.

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11668/21242

Comments

State-building||Implementation||Strategy||Iraq

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