Strategy, Implementation, and State-Building Why Governance Failed after the Post-2011 Drawdown of US Forces From Iraq?
Shoup, Brian D.
Date of Degree
Original embargo terms
Visible to MSU only for 1 Year
Graduate Thesis - Open Access
Master of Arts
College of Arts and Sciences
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
In this thesis I argue that US Military and Civilian leadership in Iraq, while both well-trained and well-intentioned, implemented a failed strategy that sought to fill institutional gaps within various national and sub-national governmental entities. This strategy provided short-term gains by increasing the capacity and capability of Iraq’s government to deliver public goods and services to its citizens thereby improving government legitimacy. Yet, in the long-term, a largely decentralized approach to development, a maladaptive transition plan, and an illusory estimate of the capacity of the security apparatus within Iraq proved detrimental to the broader US strategic objectives and state-building efforts in Iraq.
Baxter, Charles Allen, "Strategy, Implementation, and State-Building Why Governance Failed after the Post-2011 Drawdown of US Forces From Iraq?" (2019). Theses and Dissertations MSU. 4071.