Theses and Dissertations

Title

The accuracy of analyst ratings following the IPO quiet period

Issuing Body

Mississippi State University

Advisor

Highfield, Michael

Committee Member

White, Larry

Committee Member

Campbell, Randall

Committee Member

Yoder, Timothy

Committee Member

Duett, Edwin

Date of Degree

5-1-2008

Original embargo terms

MSU Only Indefinitely

Document Type

Dissertation - Open Access

Major

Business Administration (Finance)

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

College

College of Business

Department

Department of Finance and Economics

Abstract

This study examines the long-run accuracy of analyst recommendations issued at the expiration of the initial public offering (IPO) quiet period and examines the relation between the Global Settlement, NYSE Rule 472, NASD Rule 2711, and analyst recommendations. It is expected that firms which receive positive recommendations will outperform the market and firms with neutral recommendations. In addition, it is expected that banks named in the Global Settlement will become more selective when issuing recommendations. This study examines firms engaging in IPOs from July 9, 2002 through December 31, 2005 and finds that analyst ratings have become more balanced following the Global Settlement, NYSE Rule 472, and NASD Rule 2711. When controlling for firm size, underpricing, rating heterogeneity, and analyst affiliation, firms which receive positive analyst ratings experience greater buy-and-hold abnormal returns than firms which do not. Furthermore, firms which receive multiple “buy” ratings outperform firms which receive only one “buy” rating when controlling for underpricing firm size, and the number of neutral ratings. Banks named in the Global Settlement appear to be more selective when issuing positive recommendations. Firms which receive a positive rating from a bank named in the Global Settlement outperform firms which receive a positive rating from a bank not named in the Global Settlement. Lastly, prior to the Global Settlement, it appears that sanctioned banks issued ratings one level higher than they should have. Firms which received positive ratings experienced neutral performance and firms which received natural ratings experienced negative performance. Since the Global Settlement, sanctioned banks appear to issue accurate ratings since positive ratings are associated with increased buy-and-hold abnormal returns and neutral ratings do not significantly impact firm performance.

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11668/16274

Comments

Analyst Recommendations||Analyst Ratings||Analyst Bias||Initial Public Offering||Quiet Period

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