Author

Esra Memili

Issuing Body

Mississippi State University

Advisor

Chrisman, James J.

Committee Member

Holt, Daniel

Committee Member

Kellermanns, Franz W.

Committee Member

Otondo, Robert

Committee Member

Barnett, Tim

Date of Degree

1-1-2011

Document Type

Dissertation - Open Access

Major

Management

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

College

College of Business

Department

Department of Management and Information Systems

Abstract

In this dissertation, Essay 1 draws upon agency theory and corporate governance to classify control enhancing corporate governance provisions and to examine the use of these provisions within the context of publicly traded family firms. I argue that publicly traded family firms will differ from publicly traded nonfamily firms in terms of the frequency of the use of different types of control enhancing governance provisions. Specifically, I argue that family ownership will influence the frequency of the use of provisions and family management will moderate the relationships between family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions. I develop and test the hypotheses on a sample of 386 of S&P500 firms. Findings do not support the hypothesized relationships. A rationale for the non-significant relationships is also provided. In Essay 2, drawing upon agency theory and the extant family governance literature, I examine the link between family involvement, the use of governance provisions, and firm performance. I suggest that the frequency of the use of different types of control enhancing governance provisions differentially influence the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management) in the business and firm performance. I develop and test the hypotheses on 386 of the S&P500 firms. Findings support the hypotheses suggesting the moderation effects of (a) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their sustainability of controlling status on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance, (b) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting management legally on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance, (c) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their voting rights on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family management and firm performance, (d) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family management and firm performance, and (e) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting management monetarily on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family management and firm performance. Finally, results, future research directions, and implications for practice are discussed.

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11668/17828

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