Strategy, Implementation, and State-Building Why Governance Failed after the Post-2011 Drawdown of US Forces From Iraq?

Author

Charles Allen Baxter

Issuing Body

Mississippi State University

Advisor

Shoup, Brian D.

Committee Member

Tkach, Benjamin

Committee Member

Banerjee, Vasabjit

Date of Degree

5-3-2019

Original embargo terms

Worldwide

Document Type

Graduate Thesis - Open Access

Major

Political Science

Degree Name

Master of Arts

College

College of Arts and Sciences

Department

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Abstract

In this thesis I argue that US Military and Civilian leadership in Iraq, while both well-trained and well-intentioned, implemented a failed strategy that sought to fill institutional gaps within various national and sub-national governmental entities. This strategy provided short-term gains by increasing the capacity and capability of Iraq’s government to deliver public goods and services to its citizens thereby improving government legitimacy. Yet, in the long-term, a largely decentralized approach to development, a maladaptive transition plan, and an illusory estimate of the capacity of the security apparatus within Iraq proved detrimental to the broader US strategic objectives and state-building efforts in Iraq.

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11668/21242

Comments

State-building||Implementation||Strategy||Iraq

Recommended Citation

Baxter, Charles Allen, "Strategy, Implementation, and State-Building Why Governance Failed after the Post-2011 Drawdown of US Forces From Iraq?" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 4071.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/4071