![Theses and Dissertations](../../assets/md5images/007ba8c2f9f7b20b26ed4b229bc29542.jpg)
Theses and Dissertations
Issuing Body
Mississippi State University
Advisor
Shoup, Brian D.
Committee Member
Tkach, Benjamin
Committee Member
Banerjee, Vasabjit
Date of Degree
5-3-2019
Original embargo terms
Worldwide
Document Type
Graduate Thesis - Open Access
Major
Political Science
Degree Name
Master of Arts
College
College of Arts and Sciences
Department
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Abstract
In this thesis I argue that US Military and Civilian leadership in Iraq, while both well-trained and well-intentioned, implemented a failed strategy that sought to fill institutional gaps within various national and sub-national governmental entities. This strategy provided short-term gains by increasing the capacity and capability of Iraq’s government to deliver public goods and services to its citizens thereby improving government legitimacy. Yet, in the long-term, a largely decentralized approach to development, a maladaptive transition plan, and an illusory estimate of the capacity of the security apparatus within Iraq proved detrimental to the broader US strategic objectives and state-building efforts in Iraq.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11668/21242
Recommended Citation
Baxter, Charles Allen, "Strategy, Implementation, and State-Building Why Governance Failed after the Post-2011 Drawdown of US Forces From Iraq?" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 4071.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/4071
Comments
State-building||Implementation||Strategy||Iraq